The 2500th (490 BC – 2010 AD) anniversary of the
BATTLE OF MARATHON
The battle of Marathon is one of history's most famous military engagements. It is also one of the earliest recorded battles. Their victory over the Persian invaders gave the fledgling Greek city states confidence in their ability to defend themselves and belief in their continued existence, a since that time prevailing sense for the role of the Greeks through history. The Persian will and determination to expand over Europe was decisively defeated and the battle is therefore considered a defining moment in the development of European culture.
Long before meeting in the swampy fields of Marathon, Greeks and Persians were battling for the predominant role over the prosperous Greek cities of Asia Minor. Starting by mid 6th century BC all Ionian cities, but Miletus, had been subjected to king Croesus of Lydia. Taking advantage of the soft rule of Lydians, the Greek cities were flourishing in trade and art. Their real problems started when king Cyrus of Persia overrun Croesus, at the battle of Sardis (547 BC) and advanced all the way to the Aegean coastline.
The Persian Empire, a super power of the time and opponent to the Greek cities was rapidly expanding over the whole known world from Hindus River to Egypt and from Caspian to Aegean Sea. On the contrary, throughout today’s Greece, there were dozens of smaller or larger dispersed independent city-states, among them the militarist Sparta and the prosperous Athens of 250.000 inhabitants.
In Asia Minor the new rulers were very demanding over their subordinates, imposing heavy taxation. They established some trusted Greeks as local tyrants. In the framework of their wars in 513 BC, operating all the way to the north of the Danube River, the Persians had the tyrants contributing with soldiers and navy. “Great King” Darius of Persia did not fully succeed in this campaign, although he actually established a significant footprint in Europe, annexing Thrace, vassalizing most of the area of today’s Macedonia and controlling the Straights of Bosporus and Dardanelles, ensuring thus, an unhindered access to Europe. Anyway the rest of Greece, first of all the naval power of Athens, was the next objective of Darius, who was seeking to establish control over both coasts of the Aegean Sea. What happened afterwards in Ionia were just a boost and a cause for Persians to invade metropolitan Greece.
The widespread dissatisfaction of Asia Minor Greeks that besides the loss of their personal freedom were also losing the trade control, paved the way to a general revolt. The cause was a failed campaign of the Persian satrap of Ionia against the island of Naxos, in 500 BC. Agitator of this revolt was the Greek tyrant of Miletus Aristagoras, who committed himself to assist the exiled oligarchs of Naxos to overrun democrats. In 499 BC, following the failure of the King’s European Campaign, Aristagoras decided to lead a revolt against the Persian rule in Ionia. In the course, he asked for support from metropolitan Greece. It was Athens contributing with 20 ships and Eretria with 5. The initial success was followed by a disaster in the naval battle of Lade and the catastrophe of Miletus. Darius had a cause for revenge. In 492 he sent his general Mardonius against Greece. The Persian fleet was actually disabled by the harsh weather when sailing around Athos. Mardonius abandoned his operation and returned to Asia losing 300 ships and 20.000 men.
THE PERSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 490 BC
It took Persians two years to recover and return powerful against Greece. New generals were leading the invaders, Dates of the army and Artafernes of the navy, both advised by Hippias, an Athenian dissented to Persians, son of Peisistratus a former tyrant of Athens. In September 490, the Persian fleet crossed the Aegean from Cilicia to Samos and then to Naxos and finally Eretria which was quickly burnt to the ground. It was the turn of Athens. The Persian army was disembarked to the protected gulf of Marathon, 40km northeast of Athens. There, Hippias waited for support from his father’s friends, which he failed.
THE PREAMBLE AND SOME ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
Under the guidance of Miltiades, the Athenian general with the greatest experience of fighting the Persians, the Athenian army marched quickly to block the two exits from the plain of Marathon, and prevent the Persians moving inland. At the same time, Athens's greatest runner, Pheidippides had been sent to Sparta to request that the Spartan army march to the aid of Athens. Pheidippides arrived during the festival of Carneia, a sacrosanct period of peace, and was informed that the Spartan army could not march to war until the full moon rose; Athens could not expect reinforcement for at least ten days. The Athenians would have to hold out at Marathon for the time being, although they were reinforced by a contingent of hoplites from Plataea; a gesture which did much to steady the nerves of the Athenians.
For approximately five days the armies confronted each other across the plain of Marathon, in stalemate. The flanks of the Athenian camp were protected either by a grove of trees, or an abbatis of stakes (depending on the exact reading). Since every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer, the delay worked in favor of the Athenians. There were ten Athenian strategoi (generals) at Marathon, elected by each of the ten tribes that the Athenians were divided into; Miltiades was one of these. In addition, in overall charge, was the polemarchos (war archon – war lord), Callimachus who had been elected by the whole citizen body. Herodotus suggests that command rotated between the strategoi, each taking in turn a day to command the army. He further suggests that each strategos, on his day in command, instead deferred to Miltiades. In Herodotus's account, Miltiades is keen to attack the Persians (despite knowing that the Spartans are coming to aid the Athenians), but strangely, chooses to wait until his actual day of command to attack. This passage is undoubtedly problematic; the Athenians had little to gain by attacking before the Spartans arrived, and there is no real evidence of this rotating generalship. There does, however, seem to have been a delay between the Athenian arrival at Marathon, and the battle; Herodotus, who evidently believed that Miltiades was eager to attack, may have made a mistake whilst seeking to explain this delay.
As is discussed below, the reason for the delay was probably simply that neither the Athenians nor the Persians were willing to risk battle initially. This then raises the question of why the battle occurred when it did. Herodotus explicitly tells us that the Greeks attacked the Persians (and the other sources confirm this), but it is not clear why they did this before the arrival of the Spartans. There are two main theories to explain this.
The first theory is that the Persian cavalry became absent from Marathon, and that the Greeks moved to take advantage of this by attacking. This theory is based on the absence of any mention of cavalry in Herodotus' account of the battle. The entry χωρίς ιππείς ("without cavalry") is explained thus: "The cavalry left. When Datis surrendered and was ready for retreat, the Ionians climbed the trees and gave the Athenians the signal that the cavalry had left. And when Miltiades realized that, he attacked and thus won. From there comes the above-mentioned quote, which is used when someone breaks ranks before battle".
There are many variations of this theory, but perhaps the most prevalent is that the cavalry was re-embarked on the ships, and was to be sent by sea to attack (undefended) Athens in the rear, whilst the rest of the Persians pinned down the Athenian army at Marathon. This theory therefore utilizes Herodotus' suggestion that after Marathon, the Persian army re-embarked and tried to sail around Cape Sounion to attack Athens directly; however, according to the first theory this attempt would have occurred before the battle (and indeed have triggered the battle).
The second theory is simply that the battle occurred because the Persians finally moved to attack the Athenians. Although this theory has the Persians moving to the strategic offensive, this can be reconciled with the traditional account of the Athenians attacking the Persians by assuming that, seeing the Persians advancing, the Athenians took the tactical offensive, and attacked them. Obviously, it cannot be firmly established which theory (if either) is correct. However, both theories imply that there was some kind of Persian activity which occurred on or about the fifth day which ultimately triggered the battle.
THE BATTLE
Known as the "Father of History", Herodotus wrote his description of the battle a few years after it occurred. We join his account as the Athenians arrive at the battleground and are joined by a force of approximately 1000 of their Plataean allies. The Greek military leaders split on whether they should immediately attack the invaders or wait for reinforcements:
"The Athenians were drawn up in order of battle in a sacred close belonging to Heracles, when they were joined by the Plataeans, who came in full force to their aid.
Τhe Athenian generals were divided in their opinions. Some advised not to risk a battle, because they were too few to engage such a host as that of the Persians. Others were for fighting at once. Among these last was Miltiades. He therefore, seeing that opinions were thus divided, and that the less worthy counsel appeared likely to prevail, resolved to go to the polemarch [an honored dignitary of Athens], and have a conference with him. For the man on whom the lot fell to be polemarch at Athens was entitled to give his vote with the ten generals, since anciently the Athenians allowed him an equal right of voting with them. The polemarch at this juncture was Callimachus of Aphidne; to him therefore Miltiades went, and said:
'With you it rests, Callimachus, either to bring Athens to slavery, or, by securing her freedom, to be remembered by all future generations. For never since the time that the Athenians became a people were they in so great a danger as now. If they bow their necks beneath the yoke of the Persians, the woes which they will have to suffer... are already determined. If, on the other hand, they fight and overcome, Athens may rise to be the very first city in Greece.'
'We generals are ten in numbers, and our votes are divided: half of us wish to engage, half to avoid a combat. Now, if we do not fight, I look to see a great disturbance at Athens which will shake men's resolutions, and then I fear they will submit themselves. But, if we fight the battle before any unsoundness shows itself among our citizens, ...we are well able to overcome the enemy.'
The Date of the battle
Herodotus mentions for several events a date in the lunisolar calendar, of which each Greek city-state used a variant. Astronomical computation allows us to derive an absolute date in the proleptic Julian calendar, which is much used by historians as the chronological frame. Philipp August Bockh in 1855 concluded that the battle took place on September 12, 490 BC in the Julian calendar, and this is the conventionally accepted date. However, this depends on when exactly the Spartans held their festival and it is possible that the Spartan calendar was one month ahead of that of Athens. In that case the battle took place on August 12, 490 BC.
Opposing forces
Athenians
Herodotus does not give a figure for the size of the Athenian army. However, Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Ploutarch, all give the figure of 9,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans; while Justin suggests that there were 10,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans. These numbers are highly comparable to the number of troops Herodotus says that the Athenians and Plataeans sent to the Battle of Plataea 11 years later. Pausanias noticed on the monument to the battle the names of former slaves who were freed in exchange for military services. Modern historians generally accept these numbers as reasonable.
Persians
According to Herodotus, the fleet sent by Darius consisted of 600 triremes. Herodotus does not estimate the size of the Persian army, only saying that they were a "large infantry that was well packed". Among ancient sources, the poet Simonides, another near-contemporary, says the campaign force numbered 200,000; while a later writer, the Roman Cornelius Nepos estimates 200,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, of which only 100,000 fought in the battle, while the rest were loaded into the fleet that was rounding Cape Sounion; Ploutarch and Pausanias both independently give 300,000. Modern historians have proposed wide ranging numbers for the infantry, from 20,000–100,000 with a consensus of perhaps 25,000; estimates for the cavalry are in the range of 1,000.
Strategic and tactical considerations
From a strategic point of view, the Athenians had some disadvantages at Marathon. In order to face the Persians in battle, the Athenians had had to summon all available hoplites; and even then they were still probably outnumbered at least 2 to 1. Furthermore, raising such a large army had denuded Athens of defenders, and thus any secondary attack in the Athenian rear would cut the army off from the city; and any direct attack on the city could not be defended against. Still further, defeat at Marathon would mean the complete defeat of Athens, since no other Athenian army existed. The Athenian strategy was therefore to keep the Persian army pinned down at Marathon, blocking both exits from the plain, and thus preventing themselves from being outmanoeuvred. However, these disadvantages were balanced by some advantages. The Athenians initially had no need to seek battle, since they had managed to confine the Persians to the plain of Marathon. Furthermore, time worked in their favour, as every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer. Having everything to lose by attacking, and much to gain by not attacking, the Athenians remained on the defensive in the run up to the battle. Tactically, hoplites were vulnerable to attacks by cavalry, and since the Persians had substantial numbers of cavalry, this made any offensive manoeuvre by the Athenians even more of a risk, and thus reinforced the defensive strategy of the Athenians.
The Persian strategy, on the other hand, was probably principally determined by tactical considerations. The Persian infantry was evidently lightly armoured, and no match for hoplites in a head-on confrontation (as would be demonstrated at the later battles of Thermopylae and Plataea). Since the Athenians seem to have taken up a strong defensive position at Marathon, the Persian hesitance was probably a reluctance to attack the Athenians head-on.
Whatever fact eventually triggered the battle, it obviously altered the strategic or tactical balance sufficiently to induce the Athenians to attack the Persians. If the first theory is correct, then the absence of cavalry removed the main Athenian tactical disadvantage, and the threat of being outflanked made it imperative to attack. Conversely, if the second theory is correct, then the Athenians were merely reacting to the Persians attacking them. Since the Persian force obviously contained a high proportion of missile troops, a static defensive position would have made little sense for the Athenians; the strength of the hoplite was in the melee, and the sooner that could be brought about, the better, from the Athenian point of view. If the second theory is correct, this raises the further question of why the Persians, having hesitated for several days, then attacked. There may have been several strategic reasons for this; perhaps they were aware (or suspected) that the Athenians were expecting reinforcements. Alternatively, since they may have felt the need to force some kind of victory - they could hardly remain at Marathon indefinitely. In any case, the intelligence battle was clearly won by the Greek side. The presence of Greeks, forced to join the Persian military was a significant source of real-time intelligence provided to Miltiades and his lieutenants throughout the campaign and finally, of critical value for the outcome of the battle and the campaign.
The Very Battle
The distance between the two armies at the point of battle had narrowed to "a distance not less than 8 stadia" or about 1,500 meters. Miltiades ordered the two tribes that were forming the center of the Greek formation, the Leontis tribe led by Themistocles and the Antiochis tribe led by Aristides, to be arranged in the depth of 4 ranks while the rest of the tribes at their flanks were in ranks of 8. Some modern commentators have suggested this was a deliberate ploy to encourage a double envelopment of the Persian center.
When the Athenian line was ready, according to one source, the simple signal to advance was given by Miltiades: "At them". Herodotus implies the Athenians ran the whole distance to the Persian lines, shouting their ululating war cry, "ΕΛΕΛΕΥ! ΕΛΕΛΕΥ!" ("Elelef! Elelef!"). It is doubtful that the Athenians ran the whole distance; in full armor this would be very difficult. More likely, they marched until they reached the limit of the archers' effectiveness, the "beaten zone", (roughly 200 meters), and then broke into a run towards their enemy. Herodotus suggests that this was the first time a Greek army ran into battle in this way; this was probably because it was the first time that a Greek army had faced an enemy composed primarily of missile troops. All this was evidently much to the surprise of the Persians; "...in their minds they charged the Athenians with madness which must be fatal, seeing that they were few and yet were pressing forwards at a run, having neither cavalry nor archers". Indeed, based on their previous experience of the Greeks, the Persians might be excused for this; Herodotus tells us that the Athenians at Marathon were "first to endure looking at Median dress and men wearing it, for up until then just hearing the name of the Medes caused the Hellenes to panic". Passing through the hail of arrows launched by the Persian army, protected for the most part by their armor, the Greek line finally collided with the enemy army. Holland provides an evocative description:
"The enemy directly in their path ... realized to their horror that [the Athenians], far from providing the easy pickings for their bowmen, as they had first imagined, were not going to be halted... The impact was devastating. The Athenians had honed their style of fighting in combat with other phalanxes, wooden shields smashing against wooden shields, iron spear tips clattering against breastplates of bronze ... in those first terrible seconds of collision, there was nothing but a pulverizing crash of metal into flesh and bone; then the rolling of the Athenian tide over men wearing, at most, quilted jerkins for protection, and armed, perhaps, with nothing more than bows or slings. The hoplites' ash spears, rather than shivering ... could instead stab and stab again, and those of the enemy who avoided their fearful jabbing might easily be crushed to death beneath the sheer weight of the advancing men of bronze."
The Athenian wings quickly routed the inferior Persian levies on the flanks, before turning inwards to surround the Persian centre, which had been more successful against the thin Greek centre. The battle ended when the Persian centre then broke in panic towards their ships, pursued by the Greeks. Some, unaware of the local terrain, ran towards the swamps where unknown numbers drowned. The Athenians pursued the Persians back to their ships, and managed to capture 7, though the majority was able to successfully launch. Herodotus recounts the story that Cynaegirus, brother of the playwright Aeschylus, who was also among the fighters, charged into the sea, grabbed one Persian trireme, and started pulling it towards the shore. A crew member cut off his hands, and as Cynaegirus grabbed the ship by teeth, the crew cut off his head and Cynaegirus passed to immortality.
Herodotus records that 6,400 Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield, and it is unknown how many more perished in the swamps. The Athenians lost 192 men and the Plataeans 11. Among the dead was polemarchos Callimachus and strategos Stesilaos.
The Aftermath
In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Herodotus says that the Persian fleet sailed around Cape Sounion to attack Athens directly. As has been discussed, some modern historians place this attempt just before the battle. Either way, the Athenians evidently realized that their city was still under threat, and marched as quickly as possible back to Athens. The two tribes which had been in the centre of the Athenian line stayed to guard the battlefield. The Athenians arrived in time to prevent the Persians from securing a landing, and seeing that the opportunity was lost, the Persians turned about and returned to Asia. Connected with this episode, Herodotus recounts a rumor that this maneuver by the Persians had been planned in conjunction with the Alcmaeonids, the prominent Athenian aristocratic family, and that a "shield-signal" had been given after the battle. Although many interpretations of this have been offered, it is impossible to tell whether this was true, and if so, what exactly the signal meant. On the next day, the Spartan army arrived at Marathon, having covered the 220 kilometers (140 miles) in only three days. The Spartans toured the battlefield at Marathon, and agreed that the Athenians had won a great victory.
The dead of Marathon were awarded by the Athenians the special honor of being the only ones who were buried where they died instead of the main Athenian cemetery at Keramikos. On the tomb of the Athenians this epigram composed by Simonides was written:
ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ ΠΡΟΜΑΧΟΥΝΤΕΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ, ΜΑΡΑΘΩΝΙ,
ΧΡΥΣΟΦΟΡΩΝ ΜΗΔΩΝ ΕΣΤΟΡΕΣΑΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ.
(The Athenians, as defenders of the Hellenes, in Marathon,
destroyed the might of the golden-dressed Medes).
In the meanwhile, Darius began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. The epic second Persian invasion of Greece finally began in 480 BC, and the Persians met with initial success at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium. However, defeat at the Battle of Salamis would be the turning point in the campaign, and the next year the expedition was ended by the decisive Greek victory at the Battle of Plataea.
The Significance
The defeat at Marathon barely touched the vast resources of the Persian Empire, yet for the Greeks it was an enormously significant victory. It was the first time the Greeks had beaten the Persians, and showed them that the Persians were not invincible, and that resistance, rather than subjugation, was possible.
The battle was a defining moment for the young Athenian democracy, showing what might be achieved through unity and self-belief; indeed, the battle effectively marks the start of a 'golden age' for Athens. This was also applicable to Greece as a whole; "their victory endowed the Greeks with a faith in their destiny that was to endure for three centuries, during which western culture was born". John Stuart Mill's famous opinion was that "the Battle of Marathon, even as an event in British history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings". It seems that the Athenian playwright Aeschylus considered his participation at Marathon to be his greatest achievement in life (rather than his plays) since on his gravestone there was the following epigram:
ΑΙΣΧΥΛΟΝ ΕΥΦΟΡΙΩΝΟΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΝ ΤΟΔΕ ΚΕΥΘΕΙ
ΜΝΗΜΑ ΚΑΤΑΦΘΙΜΕΝΟ ΠΥΡΟΦΟΡΟΙΟ ΓΕΛΑΣ·
ΑΛΚΗΝ Δ’ ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΟΝ ΜΑΡΑΘΩΝΙΟΝ ΑΛΣΟΣ ΑΝ ΕΙΠΟΙ
ΚΑΙ ΒΑΡΥΧΑΙΤΗΕΙΣ ΜΗΔΟΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ.
(This tomb the dust of Aeschylus doth hide,
Euphorion's son and fruitful Gela's pride
How tried his valor, Marathon may tell
And long-haired Medes, who knew it all too well.)
Militarily, a major lesson for the Greeks was the potential of the hoplite phalanx. This style had developed during internecine warfare amongst the Greeks; since each city-state fought in the same way, the advantages and disadvantages of the hoplite phalanx had not been obvious. Marathon was the first time a phalanx faced more lightly-armed troops, and revealed how effective the hoplites could be in battle. The phalanx formation was still vulnerable to cavalry (the cause of much caution by the Greek forces at the Battle of Plataea), but used in the right circumstances, it was now shown to be a potentially devastating weapon.
Legends associated with the battle
The most famous legend associated with Marathon is that of the runner Pheidippides bringing news to Athens of the battle, which is described below.
Pheidippides' run to Sparta to bring aid has other legends associated with it. Herodotus mentions that Pheidippides was visited by the god Pan on his way to Sparta (or perhaps on his return journey). Pan asked why the Athenians did not honor him and Pheidippides promised that they would do so from then on. After the battle, a temple was built to him, and a sacrifice was annually offered.
Similarly, after the victory the festival of 'Agroteras Thusia', ('Thusia' means sacrifice) was held at Agrae near Athens, in honor of Artemis Agrotera. This was in fulfillment of a vow made by the city before the battle, to offer in sacrifice a number of goats equal to that of the Persians slain in the conflict. The number was so great; it was decided to offer 500 goats yearly until the number was filled. Xenophon notes that at his time, 90 years after the battle, goats were still offered yearly.
Plutarch mentions that the Athenians saw Theseus, the mythical hero of Athens leading the army in full battle gear in the charge against the Persians, and indeed he was depicted in the mural of the Poikele Stoa fighting for the Athenians, along with the twelve Olympian gods and other heroes. Pausanias also tells us that:
"They say too that there chanced to be present in the battle a man of rustic appearance and dress. Having slaughtered many of the foreigners with a plough he was seen no more after the engagement. When the Athenians made enquiries at the oracle the god merely ordered them to honor Echetlaeus (he of the Plough-tail) as a hero."
Another tale from the conflict is of the dog of Marathon. Aelian relates that one hoplite brought his dog to the Athenian encampment. The dog followed his master to battle and attacked the Persians at his master's side. He also informs us that this dog is depicted in the mural of the Poikile Stoa.
According to Herodotus, an Athenian runner named Pheidippides was sent to run from Athens to Sparta to ask for assistance before the battle, covering the distance of 140 miles in two days. Then, following the battle, the Athenian army marched the 25 or so miles back to Athens at a very high pace (considering the quantity of armor, and the fatigue after the battle), in order to head off the Persian force sailing around Cape Sounion. They arrived back in the late afternoon, in time to see the Persian ships turn away from Athens, thus completing the Athenian victory.
Later, in popular imagination, these two events became confused with each other, leading to a legendary, but inaccurate version of events. This myth has Pheidippides running from Marathon to Athens after the battle, to announce the Greek victory with the word "ΝENIKHKAMEN!" (Nenikēkamen! – We were victorious!), whereupon he promptly died of exhaustion.
When the idea of a modern Olympics became a reality at the end of the 19th century, the initiators and organizers were looking for a great popularizing event, recalling the ancient glory of Greece. The idea of organizing a 'marathon race' came from Michel Bréal, who wanted the event to feature in the first modern Olympic Games in 1896 in Athens. This idea was heavily supported by Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympics, as well as the Greeks. This would echo the legendary version of events, with the competitors running from Marathon to Athens. So popular was this event that it quickly caught on, becoming a fixture at the Olympic Games, with major cities staging their own annual events. The distance eventually became fixed at 42.195 km -the approximate distance from Marathon to Athens.
THE TROPHIES
Athenians and Plataeans captured seven Persian ships intact and they also gathered several valuable articles from the battlefield, to make a part of the “Athenian Thesaurus” at Delfi, while some were used to construct the statue of Athena in Parthenon, by Phidias. Currently, in the site you can only find the “tombs” of the 192 Athenians and the 11 Plataens but not the Persian ones (6400), although there is evidence that they were buried in spot. Lord Byron wrote in 1810: “The Mountains overlook Marathon and Marathon looks to the sea. I was there alone with my thoughts on the Persian grave and I did not consider myself a slave.” The “Column of Snakes”, a part of the “Athenian Thesaurus” of Delfi was moved from Delfi to Constantinople, to decorate the Hippodrome. It still stands there. The Snakes were allegedly decapitated by a drunken diplomat. Only one of the heads is preserved in the Istanbul Historical Museum.
EPILOGUE
On this morning of September 490 BC, some 10,000 Greeks stood assembled on the plain of Marathon, preparing to fight to the last man. Behind them lay everything they held dear: their city, their homes, their families. In front of the outnumbered Greeks stood the assembled forces of the Persian Empire, a seemingly invincible army with revenge, pillage and plunder on its mind.
The Athenians' feelings are best expressed by Aeschylus, who fought in the Persian wars, in his tragic play The Persians: "On, sons of the Hellenes! Fight for the freedom of your country! Fight for the freedom of your children and of your wives, for the gods of your fathers and for the sepulchers of your ancestors! All are now staked upon the strife!"
… When the day was over, the Greeks had won one of history's most famous victories, claiming to have killed about 6,400 Persians for the loss of only 192 Athenians and 11 Plataens… They had defeated the most powerful empire in the world…
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