SOURCE: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-you-cant-be-iran-hawk-and-russia-dove
Frederick W. Kagan, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Nicholas Carl, and George Barros
April 18, 2024
A Russian victory is an Iranian victory. Moscow and Tehran
have formed a military bloc with the aim of defeating the United States
and its allies in the Middle East, Europe, and around the world. Russian
and Iranian military forces have been fighting alongside one another in
Syria for nearly a decade. The Russians have given Iran advanced air
defenses and access to other military technologies and techniques, in
addition to a front-row seat observing their efforts to defeat American
and NATO missile defenses in Ukraine.
[1] The
Iranians in turn have given the Russians drones and access to drone
technologies, including assisting with the construction of a massive
factory to turn out thousands of Iranian drones in Russia.
[2] Further
Russian support to Iran has been limited in part because of the
setbacks Russia has suffered in Ukraine. A victorious Russia will be
free to give Iran the advanced aircraft and missile technologies Tehran
has long sought.
[3] If
Russia gains control of Ukraine’s resources, as it seeks to do, it will
be able to rebuild its own military and help Iran at the same time.
Those
concerned with the growth of Iran’s military power, ambitions, and
aggression in the Middle East must recognize the degree to which Iran’s
fortunes rise and fall with Russia’s.
The Russo-Iranian military coalition was formed in 2015 when
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Major
General Qassem Soleimani went to Moscow to seek help in keeping Bashar
al Assad in power in Syria.[4] The
Russians sent their own combat aircraft, intelligence and electronic
warfare assets, and SPETSNAZ (special forces), along with a limited
contingent of ground forces to help Soleimani.
[5] Russian
forces provided air support to Iranian troops and proxies, including
Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-controlled Iraqi militias, fighting
against the anti-Assad opposition—especially the part of that opposition
that the United States supported.
[6] Russian forces remain in Syria to this day, operating in support of the expanding Iranian presence there.
[7]
The Iranians learned a great deal from the combined military
operations they conducted with the Russians in Syria, including how to
plan and conduct complex ground campaigns and how to incorporate
fixed-wing air support with ground troops.[8] The
Russians benefited in turn by establishing a major airbase near Latakia
and a naval base at Tartus, both effectively defended by the ground
forces of Assad, Iran, and Iranian proxies.[9] Russian air and naval forces remain in both locations.
The Russians entered the Syrian Civil War ostensibly to fight the
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), but they did little against
ISIS. Their main focus was on helping Assad destroy the moderate
opposition and retaining, then solidifying his hold on power.[10] The
Russian forces in Syria regularly interfered with and constrained the
operations of US aircraft attempting to support US forces and allies who
were actually fighting ISIS.[11] The Russians forced the United States to establish deconfliction procedures that effectively divided Syria in half.[12] The
United States and its partners focused on defeating ISIS in the
northeast, while the Russians and the Iranians focused on strengthening
their positions in the southwest even as ISIS retained positions there.[13]
Russo-Iranian military cooperation has expanded dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The
Iranians began sending hundreds of reconnaissance and long-range attack
drones to Russia in August 2022 as the Russians exhausted their supply
of missiles.[14] Those
drones let Russia maintain and increase its pressure on Ukrainian air
defenses even as it worked to expand production and modification of its
own missile systems. The Iranians even helped Russia build a massive
factory in the Republic of Tatarstan able to produce thousands of such
drones.[15] The
Russians have given Syria short-range air defense systems such as the
Pantsir, which Syrian forces reportedly used in vain attempts to shoot
down Israeli aircraft.[16]
Russian and Iranian military officials have been closely coordinating
mutual military and security assistance. Iranian Law Enforcement
Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan, who is responsible for
internal security and repression in Iran, flew to Moscow in June 2023 to
discuss expanding cooperation on internal security matters with Russian
security service heads.[17] Radan’s
visit notably occurred a few days after the failed armed mutiny of
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, which prompted a renewed
emphasis on Russian internal security. The Iranian army’s Ground Forces
Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari met with his Russian
counterpart, General Oleg Salyukov, in August 2023 to discuss increasing
cooperation.[18] Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu went to Tehran in September 2023 for the same purpose.[19] IRGC
Aerospace Forces Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh took
Shoigu on a tour of Iran’s drone, missile, and air defense arsenal at
the IRGC Aerospace Forces headquarters.[20] Shoigu also met Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani on that trip.[21] The
Chief of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (roughly equivalent to the
US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff), Major General Mohammad
Bagheri, spoke with Shoigu on October 19, 2023, to discuss the
Israel-Hamas war.[22] The
secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (roughly
equivalent to the US National Security Adviser) met with Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s Special Representative for Syrian Affairs,
Alexander Lavrentiev, in Tehran on November 1, 2023, to discuss
political and security cooperation and coordination in Syria.[23] Russian
Defense Minister Shoigu spoke with Iranian Defense Minister Ashtiani
once more on January 15, 2024. And Rustam Minnikhanov, chairman of the
board of directors of the Tupolev aircraft manufacturing firm and head
of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan where Iran has been helping Russia
build a massive drone factory, made an official visit to Iran on
February 14, 2024.[24] Minnikhanov visited Esfahan, the heart of Iran’s military industry and especially the aerospace industry.[25]
These high-level engagements are remarkable for their frequency
during periods when both Russian and Iranian senior military officials
should have been fully occupied with their own problems—the war in
Ukraine in Russia’s case, and the Israel-Hamas War in Iran’s.
Lower-level but possibly more significant technical experts have also
been on the move. Seventeen Iranian officials reportedly visited a
Russian air defense system plant in Yekaterinburg in March 2023.[26] The
plant, under US sanctions for supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine,
produces mobile launchers and other components of anti-aircraft systems
including the advanced S-400 system.[27]
Russia has been providing concrete assistance to Iran beyond
the S-300 batteries it delivered in 2016. The Russians launched an
Iranian Khayyam remote-sensing satellite into space in August 2022.[28] Russia
reportedly provides Iran with advanced surveillance software, cash, and
technical assistance to Iran’s Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) and missile
program.[29] The SLV
program is particularly significant because it can support the
development of nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). The Russians delivered two Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft to
Iran on September 2, 2023, likely as a down-payment on the delivery of
the more advanced Su-35 fighter-bombers Iran has been requesting for
some years.[30] The
Russians have also reportedly been sharing captured US and NATO weapons,
including Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-aircraft systems, with
Iran presumably so that both sides can reverse-engineer them and develop
counter-measures to them.[31] Russia
and Iran were reportedly in negotiations with China to help Iran
replenish its supplies of a key component of its solid-rocket fuel
supply chain, although the outcome of that effort is not clear.[32] The
Iranians have also reportedly asked Russia for help obtaining
additional nuclear materials and with nuclear fuel fabrication.[33]
Russo-Iranian military collaboration very likely shaped the
design of Iran’s failed April 13, 2024, drone-missile strike on Israel,
since the combination of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles
Iran used mirrored packages the Russians have developed to penetrate
US- and NATO-provided missile defenses in Ukraine.[34] The
failure of that package to get more than a handful of ballistic
missiles through should not generate complacency, especially since the
Iranians now better understand what volume and combination of types of
munitions they may need to penetrate Israeli air defenses. The Russians
have moreover demonstrated in Ukraine that repeated attempts to find
vulnerabilities in missile defense systems can ultimately succeed—and
have shown that they are willing to share their insights with Iran.
The Iranians have maintained a long list of Russian combat systems
they desire for many years. The list includes the Su-35 and the Su-34,
as well as S-400 air defense systems, tanks, and many other pieces of
military hardware.[35] The Russians have historically dithered in giving Iran such advanced systems.[36] Before
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian dithering likely resulted
from Moscow’s efforts to balance between supporting Iran and maintaining
good relations with Israel and the Arab States — all of whom would be
seriously alarmed and alienated by the provision of such weapons to
Iran. Since the invasion, the Russians have not had such
systems to spare. But Putin has moved closer and closer to siding openly
with Iran against Israel. The victorious end of Putin’s war in Ukraine
would lift the material constraints on the provision of advanced
military equipment to Iran.
The days of Russia balancing between Iran and Israel appear to be
coming to an end, in fact. The Russians have become loud advocates of a
ceasefire in Gaza, which Israel opposes, and have repeatedly hosted
representatives of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other
Iran-aligned militias in Moscow.[37] Iranian
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani met his Russian
counterpart, Sergei Ryabkov, in Moscow on October 26.[38] Hamas Politburo Member Musa Abu Marzouk was in Moscow at the same time and met Bagheri Kani there on October 27.[39] Iranian
and Russian officials continued coordinating on the Israel-Hamas war in
November 2023, and the readout of such a meeting in late December 2023
concluded that the Russians and Iranians were discussing “political
ways” to end the Israeli ground operation in Gaza, force an immediate
ceasefire, and provide humanitarian aid to Gazans.[40] Reports
from about this time indicated that the Russians might even have been
considering sending air defense systems to Hezbollah.[41] These
efforts culminated in a March 19, 2024, conversation between Iranian
President Ebrahim Raisi and Russian President Putin in which Putin said
that he was “ready to cooperate more and more effectively” with Iran
about the “Palestinian issue” and that Russia and Iran share the same
position on that issue.[42]
Constraints on Russia’s ability to supply Iran with advanced weaponry
will also begin lifting if Russia defeats Ukraine. Ukrainian forces
supplied with Western weapons have wrought havoc on Russian systems,
destroying thousands of tanks and armored personnel carriers as well as
aircraft and air defense systems. The Russian defense industry has been
racing to make good Russian losses, and its inability to do so has led
in part to Russia’s desperation for Iranian (and North Korean and
Chinese) military assistance. Ukraine once defeated, however, the
Russian defense industry will remain mobilized first to rebuild the
Russian army, but then to resume the export of advanced military systems
interrupted by the war. The increasingly close relationship between
Russia and Iran spurred by Iran’s stalwart support for the Russian war
effort makes the prospect that Russia will ultimately follow through on
promises to give Iran some of its most advanced military systems much
likelier than it has ever been.
There is little reason to expect that the West can drive a
wedge between Moscow and Tehran at this point. Russian rhetoric and
actions have become ferociously anti-Western and have come to share many
of the overtones of civilizational conflict that have long
characterized Iranian ideology. The fact that Russia seeks, in
principle, to build an anti-Western Christian civilization whereas
Tehran desires an anti-Western Muslim one is not material as long as
both agree that defeating the United States and its allies is the top
priority, as they do.
The primary constraint on Russian support to Iran, therefore, is
Russia’s weakness. A Russia battered by failure in Ukraine, licking its
wounds, and facing a strong and independent Ukrainian state will have
limited resources and energy to devote to helping Iran. A Russia
triumphant over the United States and NATO in Ukraine and with the
resources of Ukraine at its disposal, on the other hand, will have ample
capacity to repay its friends and support them in their efforts to
achieve an aim Russia shares — defeating the United States and expelling
it from the Middle East.
The notion that the United States should allow Russia to win in
Ukraine in order to resist Iran in the Middle East is thus indefensible.
Americans must internalize the unpleasant reality that the
Russo-Iranian military bloc is a real and vibrant thing, that Moscow
will support Tehran against us and our allies as best it can, and that
Russia’s victory is Iran’s victory. Russia’s loss, contrariwise, is
Iran’s loss. Those wishing to contain Iran therefore must also support
helping Ukraine against Russia.
[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/15/iran-israel-...
https://apnews.com/article/iran-russia-fighter-drone-495c0018a9af2443e76...
https://t.me/rybar/43630
[2] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drone-factory-ukraine-war-dfdfb46...
[3] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/downplaying-speculation-iran-hedges-on...
[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0S02BV/
[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/29/how-russian...
https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Deployment%20...(1).pdf
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstri... l
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Airstrike...
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-...
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-iran-learning-russia-s...
[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/29/how-russian...
[10] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria
[11] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-and-russia-remain-at-odds-in-skies-over-...
[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/12/14/u-s-f-22s-f... ;
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/syria-s-buffer-zone-al...
[13] https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/08/politics/us-russia-hindering-isis-fight-s...
[14] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publicatio... ; https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/mar/01/timeline-iran-russia-collab...
[15] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drone-factory-ukraine-war-dfdfb46...
[16] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0RB1Q0/
[17] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/06/27/2917418
[18] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85206058/Iran-Russia-army-ground-forces-agree-to-boost-cooperation
[19] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85233000
[20] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1528556
[21] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/617459
[22] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/624279
[23] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/11/02/2982001
[24] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4154810
[25] https://ostan-es
dot
ir/24250/%D8%AA%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%B1%D9%88/
[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/15/iran-israel-...
[27] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/15/iran-israel-...; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=17259
[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-launches-iranian-satellite-into-spa...
[29] https://ru.usembassy.gov/fireside-chat-with-director-william-burns-aspen...; https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/director-burns-remarks-at-the-aspen-se...
[30] https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2023/09/02/iran-reportedly-receiv...
[31] https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/10/politics/russia-iran-ukraine-weapons/inde...
[32] https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-xi-jinping-ch...
[33] https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/04/politics/iran-russia-nuclear-program/inde...
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran%E2%80%99s-attempt-hit...
[35] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/russia-providing-unprecedented-military...; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/15/iran-israel-...; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/14/russia-may-sell-iran-10-bill...
[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/15/iran-israel-...
[37] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230316-hamas-sent-high-level-delegat...; https://tass dot ru/politika/20002887; https://theins dot ru/news/269255; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/18/7442422/
[38] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85271712
[39] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020805000283
[40] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021003000248
[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-intelligence-thinks-wagner-plans-send-a... https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/02/politics/syrias-assad-hezbollah-wagner-mi...
[42] https://en dot mehrnews.com/news/213182/Russia-Iran-share-positions-regarding-Palestine-issue; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/12/29/3057257/
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